






On foucault’s Stoicism and Hegel’s critique of the 
Stoic Point of View in Relation to the Problem of freedom
Abstract
I argue that to understand Hegel’s critique of Stoicism in relation to the problem of freedom 
it is important to appreciate some Foucault’s ideas and those of the Foucauldian circle 
influenced by his thought. I will begin by discussing Foucault’s reference to Greco-Roman 
Philosophy in his lectures at Collège	de	France. In those lectures, by using Hadot’s concept 
of spiritual	exercises, he tries to constitute ethics of the self based on a conception of subjec-
tive freedom. Afterwards, I will deal with Hegel’s critique of Stoicism on the ground of the 
Stoic theory of oikeiōsis. Hegel’s interpretation of this theory is the basis of his critical at-
titude towards Stoicism. There is a connection between Stoicism and Foucault’s late period 
in respect to the conception of freedom, which is entirely based on subjectivity. At the end of 
this paper, I hope to show that Hegel’s critique of Stoic ethics, beginning with an examina-
tion of the theory of oikeiōsis, can provide us with an opportunity to criticise the subjective 




1. foucault’s Stoic Mood
A	Foucauldian	approach	to	the	problem	of	freedom	presents	us	with	a	per-
spective	of	subjective	freedom1	in	which	the	concept	of	“the	care	of	the	self”	




























































their	entire	 life	at	a	philosophical,	 that	means,	 therapeutic	 level.	According	
to	him,	from	Socrates	to	the	Hellenistic	and	Roman	philosophers,	all	ancient	
philosophy	can	be	evaluated	 in	 the	 light	of	 the	dealing	of	 the	 subject	with	
itself.	 It	 seems	 that	 Hadot’s	 thoughts	 concerning	 ancient	 philosophy	 must	
have	been	very	on	the	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	power	and	subject	




Hadot	 (Foucault,	1990:	8).	But	 there	are	 some	crucial	differences	between	






















































philosopher	 compelled	 to	 do	 likewise;	 for	
philosophy	is	the	[Art]	of	Life”	[“Quo	magis	












Plato	 and	 the	 Greco-Roman	 Philosophy,	 it	
might	be	claimed	that	“the	figure	of	Socrates”	
(especially,	 the	Platonic	Socrates)	 is	 a	 para-
digm	of	this	period,	and	the	role	of	Socrates	
especially	in	the	Stoic	tradition	is	dominant.	










life.	However,	 Foucault’s	 distinction	 here	 is	







For	 a	 comparison	 of	 the	 Platonic,	 Christian	
and	Stoic	 positions	 in	 the	 framework	of	 the	
concept	of	metanoia,	see	(Weiss,	2014:	220–
221):	“Platonic	epistrophē	is	transformed	into	



















































































































Hellenistic	 philosophy:	 “But	 in	 the	 admira-




















At	 this	 moment,	 it	 can	 be	 claimed	 that	

































2. Hegel’s critique of Stoic Philosophy 
  Based on the Theory of Oikeiōsis
Hegel’s	 examination	 of	 Stoicism,	 along	with	 Scepticism	 and	 the	Unhappy	
Consciousness,	in	the	chapter	titled	“Freedom	of	Self-Consciousness”	in	Phe-
























essential	way,	and,	 to	be	sure,	 this	chapter	 is	very	 important	 to	understand	
the	journey	of	spirit	from	consciousness	and	self-consciousness	to	absolute	
spirit.	But,	 in	 this	 paper,	 I	will	 focus	on	 the	 chapter	 about	Stoicism	 in	his	
Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie to	establish	a	connection	
with	the	current	“Stoic”	conception	of	freedom,	which	is	articulated	from	the	




























tion	[oute poiēsasan auto, mēt’ allotriōsai mēt’ oikeiōsai].	We	are	forced	then	to	conclude	that	
nature	in	constituting	the	animal	made	it	near	and	dear	to	itself;	for	so	it	comes	to	repel	all	that	





individual	 level.	 In	 his	 lectures	 entitled	 The 
Government of Self and Others	Foucault	ex-
amined	the	Apology	in	the	framework	of	the	








he	 argues	 that	 “it	 involves	 renouncing	 any	
political	ascendancy	and	power	over	others”.	
Yet,	this	renouncing	means,	in	Socrates’	case,	




aspect	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 politics	
and	philosophy,	Foucault	indicates	the	politi-
cal	importance	of	the	Socratic	parrhēsia,	and	
says	 that	 “philosophy’s	 question	 is	 not	 the	









I	refer	to	Hadot’s	book	The Inner Citadel: The 













those	things	which	appear	to	threaten	destruction.”	[simul atque natum sit animal (…) ipsum sibi 
conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque quae conservantia sunt 
eius status diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus quae interitum videantur afferre]	
(Cicero,	1931:	III,	16)




































Roces	 translates	 it	 as	 la consonancia	 into	Spanish,	 by	 taking	 into	 account	
sunphōnē	(Hegel,	1995b:	359).	I	would	prefer	to	use	the	word	“concordance”,	
similar	 to	 the	way	 in	which	Pierre	Garnion,	a	French	 translator	of	Hegel’s	
Lectures on the History of Philosophy,	prefers	to	translate	a	phrase	as	la con-











































In	 a	 current	 article,	 Jacop	 Klein	 similarly	






















ing	 according	 to	 nature”	 (homologoumenos 
tē phusei zēn),	or	“living	in	accordance	with	
nature”,	see	(Von	Arnim,	SVF:	III:	1–19).	In	
Cicero’s	De finibus	 “living	according	 to	na-
ture”	is	put	forward	in	respect	of	oikieōsis	and	
kathēkon	 (officio:	 appropriate	 act,	 or	 duty):	










not	 achieve	 a	 concrete	 unity	 of	 the	 universal	 and	 the	 individual.	There	 is,	
on	the	one	hand,	the	universal	ideal	of	the	virtuous	wise	man	(sophos)	 lib-





























abstract	 independence	 from	 the	external	world	must	 also	go	 to	a	universal	
determination	of	morality,	but	this	universality	remains	necessarily	abstract	
and	 formal,	 that	means,	 in	 this	way,	 it	 cannot	be	actualised	 in	a	 living	and	
concrete	process.	The	Stoic	philosopher	eagerly	deals	with	their	own	self,	and	
they	only	take	care	of	themselves	in	their	subjectivity	but,	starting	from	this	
































its	home	in	the	Roman	world	[in der römischen Welt ist daher besonders die 






















period	 is	 a	 decline:	 “For	 Hegelian	 idealists	
post-Aristotelian	 philosophy	 represents	 a	
marked	decline	 from	 the	apogee	 reached	by	
Aristotle	 and	 Plato.”	 (Long,	 2006:	 361)	 On	





self”	 (Long,	 2006:	 20).	 It	might	 be	 claimed	




















































Subject ist so dasjenige, wofür gesorgt warden soll)	(Hegel,	1986a:	251),	that	
is	to	say,	the	concept	of	Sorge	(care)	is	regarded	as	a	personal	and	subjective	
matter.	As	 a	 result,	 if	we	 consider	 the	 Stoic	 conception	 of	oikeiōsis,	 even	
though	Stoic	thought	lays	emphasis	on	an	“other-concern”	in	a	certain	degree,	
it	could	be	said	that	this	emphasis	should	remain	limited,	because	the	Stoic	


























sense,	when	Hegel	defines	freedom	as	“Bei-sich-selbst-Sein in einem Andere”,	
that	means,	“to	be	with	oneself	in	an	other”	or	“to	be	at	home	in	an	other”,	he	is	
suggesting	that	freedom	requires	a	mediation	of	others,	and	it	cannot	be	actual-
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O foucaultovu stoicizmu i Hegelovoj kritici 
stoičkog gledišta u odnosu spram problema slobode
Sažetak
Da bi se razumjela Hegelova kritika stoicizma u svezi problema slobode, argumentiram da 
je važno cijeniti neke Foucaultove ideje te ideje fukoovskog kruga. Započet ću raspravljajući 
o Foucaultovoj referenci na grčko­rimsku filozofiju u njegovim predavanjima na Collège de 
France. U tim predavanjima, služeći se Hadotovom koncepcijom duhovnih vježbi, pokušava 
utvrditi etiku sebstva na osnovi koncepcije subjektivne slobode. Nakon toga, bavim se Hegelo-
vom kritikom stoicizma na osnovi stoičke teorije oikeiōsisa. Hegelova interpretacija navedene 
teorije osnova je njegovog kritičkog stava prema stoicizmu. Postoji veza između stoicizma i 
Foucaultova kasnijeg perioda misli s obzirom na koncept slobode, u potpunosti temeljenog na 
subjektivnosti. Na kraju rada, nadam se pokazati da nam Hegelova kritika stoičke etike daje 









Über foucaults Stoizismus und Hegels Kritik des 
stoischen Standpunkts in Bezug auf das Problem der freiheit
Zusammenfassung
Um Hegels Kritik an Stoizismus in Bezug auf das Problem der Freiheit zu verstehen, argumen-
tiere ich, dass es bedeutend ist, einige Ideen von Foucault sowie die Ideen des foucaultschen 
Kreises zu würdigen. Ich beginne mit der Erörterung zu Foucaults Referenz an die griechisch-
römische Philosophie in seinen Vorlesungen an der Collège de France. Indem er sich an Hadots 
Konzeption der geistigen Übungen stützt, versucht er in diesen Vorlesungen, die Ethik des Selbst 
auf der Grundlage der Konzeption der subjektiven Freiheit zu etablieren. Danach beschäftige 
ich mich mit Hegels Kritik des Stoizismus, basierend auf der stoischen Theorie der oikeiōsis. 
Hegels Interpretation der erwähnten Theorie ist das Substrat seiner kritischen Haltung gegenü-
ber dem Stoizismus. Es besteht ein Zusammenhang zwischen Stoizismus und Foucaults späterer 
Gedankenperiode hinsichtlich des Freiheitskonzepts, die vollständig auf Subjektivität beruht. 
Am Ende des Aufsatzes versuche ich zu zeigen, dass Hegels Kritik der stoischen Ethik uns die 






Sur le stoïcisme de foucault et la critique de Hegel du 
point de vue stoïque par rapport au problème de la liberté
Résume
Afin de comprendre la critique hégélienne du stoïcisme liée au problème de la liberté, je sou-
tiens qu’il est important de reconnaître la valeur des idées de Foucault, mais également les 
idées du cercle foucaldien. Je commencerai par discuter des références de Foucault à la philo-
sophie gréco-romaine lors de ses cours au Collège de France. Dans ces cours, Foucault tente 
d’établir une éthique du soi basée sur la conception de la liberté subjective en se servant de la 
notion d’exercices spirituels de Hadot,. Ensuite, j’aborderai la critique hégélienne du stoïcisme 
sur la base de la théorie stoïque de l’oikeiōsis. L’attitude critique de Hegel envers le stoïcisme 
se fonde sur sa propre interprétation de la théorie stoïque. Il existe un lien entre le stoïcisme et 
la période tardive de la pensée de Foucault eu égard au concept de la liberté, qui se fonde dans 
son ensemble sur la subjectivité. À la fin du présent article, j’espère être en mesure de montrer 
que la critique hégélienne de l’éthique stoïque nous présente une opportunité pour critiquer le 
point de vue subjectif eu égard au problème de la liberté.
Mots-clés
Michel	Foucault,	souci	de	soi,	stoïcisme,	Georg	Wilhelm	Friedrich	Hegel,	oikeiōsis,	liberté,	subjec-
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